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This paper studies the dynamics of fast flux service networks
and their role in online scam hosting infrastructures. By
monitoring changes in DNS records of over 350 distinct fast
flux domains collected from URLs in 115,000 spam emails
at a large spam sinkhole, we measure the rate of change of
DNS records, accumulation of new distinct IPs in the host-
ing infrastructure, and location of change both for individual
domains and across 21 different scam campaigns.
We find that fast flux networks redirect clients at much
different rates—and at different locations in the DNS
hierarchy—than conventional load-balanced Web sites. We
also find that the IP addresses in the fast flux infrastructure
itself change rapidly, and that this infrastructure is shared ex-
tensively across scam campaigns, and some of these IP ad-
dresses are also used to send spam. Finally, we compared IP
addresses in fast-flux infrastructure and flux domains with
various blacklists (i.e., SBL, XBL/PBL, and URIBL) and
found that nearly one-third of scam sites were not listed in
the URL blacklist at the time they were hosting scams. We
also observed many hosting sites and nameservers that were
listed in both the SBL and XBL both before and after we ob-
served fast-flux activity; these observations lend insight into
both the responsiveness of existing blacklists and the life cy-
cles of fast-flux nodes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online scams require victims to contact a point-of-sale
Web site, which must be both highly available and dynamic
enough to evade detection and blocking. Until recently,
many sites for a scam were hosted by a single IP address for
a considerable amount of time (i.e., up to a week) [2]; unfor-
tunately, the relatively static nature of these sites made it pos-
sible to block scams with simple countermeasures, such as
blocking the IP address. To maintain sites that are both dy-
namic and highly available, cybercriminals are increasingly
using fast flux—a DNS-based technique used by botnets to
rapidly change these delivery sites.
In this paper, we find that the scam infrastructure has be-
come considerably more sophisticated and dynamic. Indeed,
∗The authors will publish their dataset and analysis scripts and
would like to be considered for the best paper award.
in this paper we show that attackers have developed a sophis-
ticated infrastructure for directing victims to scam sites that
move around frequently to evade detection and blocking. At-
tackers that mount scam campaigns appear to be making
extensive use of fast-flux service networks [8], which can
dynamically (and quickly) redirect clients to different sites
for hosting scams. The machines that host content are typi-
cally ephemeral (i.e., they may simply be compromised ma-
chines) and distinct from the controllers that provide content
and control redirections.
This paper studies the dynamics of fast-flux service net-
works as they are used to host point-of-sale sites for email
scam campaigns. We study the scam sites that were hosted
by more than 350 domains as part of 21 scam campaigns in
over 115,000 emails collected over the course of a month at
a large spam simkhole. We study characteristics of dynam-
ics of the infrastructure hosting fast-flux service networks,
the roles that various machines play in hosting online scams,
and the effectiveness of various blacklists at identifying IP
addresses and URLs of scam sites.
Previous work has studied the rates at which fast-flux net-
works change DNS A-record mappings (i.e., name to IP
address mappings) and the rate at which new IP addresses
are accumulated [6]; this paper expands on that study and
presents many new classes of findings. First, we study fast-
flux networks by campaign to determine whether dynamics
differ across campaigns, and whether distinct spam cam-
paigns share fast-flux service infrastructure. Second, we
perform continual and iterative DNS monitoring to discover
the locations in the DNS hierarchy where fast-flux networks
dynamically redirect clients. Finally, we study the roles of
fast-flux nodes in hosting different parts of the infrastructure
(e.g., authoritative name server, Web server, or spammer)
and how these roles evolve over time.
Table 1 summarizes the findings of our study and possible
implications for these findings. We present findings regard-
ing the following aspects of fast-flux networks:
• Rate of change. We examine the rates at which fast-
flux networks redirect clients to different authorita-
tive name servers (either by changing the authoritative
nameserver’s name or IP address), or to different Web




Rates of change. DNS records change more quickly than
TTL values. NS records are more stable than A records or
IPs of NS records. DNS records for fast flux domains change
more quickly than those from “legitimate” popular domains.
Fig. 3, Fig. 4 Blacklisting authoritative name server names may help with
fast-flux mitigation.
Rates of accumulation. Different scam campaigns (and
URLs for those campaigns) recruit new IP addresses at dif-
ferent rates
Fig. 6 The rate at which a URL “accumulates” new IP addresses
may help detect fast flux networks and also identify scam
campaigns.
Location of change in DNS hierarchy. Different fast-flux
domains change at different locations in the DNS hierarchy
(i.e., A records, IP of NS record, NS record).
Tab. 6
Roles
Sharing. Different scam campaigns share fast-flux infras-
tructure
Tab. 3, Tab. 4,
Tab. 9 Identifying fast-flux infrastructure may help with early de-tection of scam campaigns.
Distribution across /24s. Fast flux domains return A
records that are distributed over a far larger set of /24s than
legitimate popular Web sites (as seen when queried from a
single DNS location).
Fig. 9 The distribution of query results across IP address space may
be useful for detecting fast-flux activity.
Distribution in IP address space. A and NS records are
distributed across IP address space, but some regions have a
high density of both fast-flux agents and spammers.
Fig. 7 Detection of spammers might also help detect fast-flux net-
works, and vice versa.
Blacklists. Some IP addresses that appear as flux agents
appear in spam and exploit blacklists weeks later.
Fig. 10, Tab. 10,
Tab. 11 Identification of FF infrastructures can help towards earlierblacklisting of spam/exploit IPs and vice versa.
Table 1: Summary of results.
ues do not differ fundamentally from other sites that do
DNS-based load balancing, the rates of change (1) dif-
fer fundamentally from legitimate load balancing ac-
tivities; (2) differ across individual scam campaigns.
• Rate of accumulation (“recruit”). We study the extent
to which individual fast-flux networks “recruit” new IP
addresses and how the rate of growth varies across dif-
ferent scam campaigns. We find that, while there is a
considerable amount of sharing of IP addresses across
different scam campaigns, different campaigns accu-
mulate new IP addresses at different rates.
• Location of change. We study the extent to which fast-
flux networks change the Web servers to which clients
are redirected. We infer the location of change by
monitoring any changes of (1) the authoritative name-
servers for the domains that clients resolve (the NS
record, or the IP address associated with an NS record)
or of (2) the mapping of the domain name to the IP
address itself (the A record for the name). We find
that behavior differs by campaign, but that many scam
campaigns redirect clients by changing all three types
of mappings, whereas most legitimate load-balancing
activities only involve changes to A records.
• Use and sharing of infrastrcture. We study the geo-
graphical and topological locations of fast-flux hosts
(both authoritative nameservers and Web servers), as
well as how fast-flux infrastructure is shared over time,
across scam campaigns, and between spamming and
hosting infrastructure. We find that different scam
campaigns share fast-flux infrastructure; we also find
overlap between spamming infrastructure and online
scam hosting infrastructure.
Our findings lend insights into the operation of fast-flux net-
works that may ultimately lead to more effective mitigation
techniques: Although scam campaigns are short-lived, the
infrastructure that hosts these scams (i.e., the fast-flux net-
work or networks) appears to have relatively invariant fea-
tures that may prove useful for identifying scams and the
spam messages that advertise them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes background on fast-flux networks, current under-
standing about their roles in hosting online scams, and re-
lated work in studying fast-flux networks. Section 3 de-
scribes our data collection methods, as well as various lim-
itations of our dataset. Section 4 describes the dynamics of
fast-flux service networks that we observed hosting 21 dif-
ferent spam campaigns over the course of a month. Section 5
describes the roles that we observed each IP address playing
in the fast flux networks, the locations of spammers and fast
flux infrastructure in the IP address space, and the sharing
of infrastructure across different roles. Section 6 describes
the relationships between when various blacklists listed IP
addresses and when these IP addresses were seen in the fast-
flux hosting infrastructure that we observed in our data. Sec-
tion 7 concludes with a summary and discussion of future
work.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We describe main redirection techniques commonly em-
ployed by fast flux service networks and show an example
illustrating how this technique can be observed from DNS
responses. We then discuss related work.
2.1 Fast-Flux Mechanics
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Domain name: pathsouth.com & responding authoritative nameserver: 218.236.53.11
Time: 20:51:52 (GMT)






















































Table 2: DNS lookup results of the pathsouth.com fluxing domain: The IP addresses in bold highlight changes
between the two lookups six minutes apart.
Fast flux is a DNS-based method that cybercriminals use
in order to organise, sustain and protect their service infras-
tructures such as illegal web hosting and spamming [21].
Multiple cybercriminal families have been observed to use
the fast flux techniques for illegal or fake online businesses,
phishing sites, adult content sites [14]. Somewhat similar to
a technique used by content distribution networks (CDNs)
such as Akamai, a fast-flux domain is served by many dis-
tributed machines and short time-to-live (TTL) values are
used to quickly change a mapping between a domain and an
IP address. However, the hosts involved for serving a fast-
flux domain are botnet zombie drones and instead of hosting
actual content, these zombies often act as front-end prox-
ies that relay messages between a client and a “mothership”
node [21]. Consequently, using this fast flux technique, cy-
bercriminals can easily throw in and out a large number of
compromised hosts as needed while effectively hiding their
mothership node.
Variations of the technique also exist [21]. In addition to
fluctuating address records (A records), a fast-flux domain
can have changing name servers records (NS records or IP
addresses of NS records). In practice, any combinations of
DNS record fluctuations can be used for flexible and resilient
operations. Moreover, as we will show in Section 4.3, many
hosts exploited by fast-flux service networks are found to
play the role of both a hosting server (or a front end proxy
of it) and an authoritative name server (or a front end proxy
of it).
The dynamics of fast-flux service networks make ineffec-
tive the existing mitigation scheme that relies on blacklist-
ing offending hosts. Operators of such networks can simply
swap out blacklisted hosts. Moreover, by constantly moni-
toring the “health” of individual hosts, the operators can in-
crease service availability from likely unstable compromised
machines. To demonstrate how quickly fast-flux service net-
works change, we show an example of a fast-flux domain
that we monitored on January 20, 2008 at 20:51:52 GMT.
The fast-flux domain is called pathsouth.com and at that
time it was pointing to one of illegal pharmaceutical compa-
nies called Canadian Pharmacy [18]. Table 2 shows the DNS
records resulted from two lookups with seven minutes apart.
The first column shows the IP addresses of spam sources,
from which our spamtrap received copies of spam contain-
ing the fast-flux domain. The ten records in bold show that
the domain swapped in nine new hosts for serving content
and one new name server.
2.2 Related Work
The operation of fast-flux service networks was first de-
scribed in detail by the Honeynet Project [21]. By closely
monitoring the behavior of fast-flux agents executed in test
environments, the report showed two different types of fast-
flux service networks—single-flux and double-flux. Their
findings provide insights on the changing nature of fast-flux
service networks and lead us to design the multi-level mea-
surement method that form the bases of our study of dynam-
ics of scam infrastructure.
Because it is only less than a year since the details were
publicly known, there are few empirical studies on fast-flux
networks. Holz et al. [6] analyzed fast flux domains using
periodic DNS lookups and presented the characteristics fo-
cusing on the diversity of A records and the network loca-
tions (AS numbers) that these A records reside at. They also
showed various analysis results including the percentage of
scam campaigns leveraging fast-flux service networks and
the rate at which new machines are added to fast flux do-
mains for a few selected ones. In addition to these mea-
surements, we measured the change of fast flux domains at
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multiple levels of the DNS hierarchy (A records, NS records,
and IPs of NS records) and found many different structures
of fast-flux service networks, some of which are previously
unknown. We also present the geographic and topological
distribution of flux hosts, the prevalence resource sharing
found across different scam campaigns, and the relationship
between fast-flux agents and various blacklists.
Previous work observed fast-flux domains via DNS mea-
surement [24]. From the analysis of passively collected DNS
responses at a university gateway, Zdrnja et al. observed an
instance of fast-flux domain that was short lived (only for
three days) and resolved to 80 different IP addresses [24].
In comparison, our study actively probes a large number of
suspicious DNS domains to profile different types of fast-
flux networks over a longer period of time.
Our primary data is drawn from emails collected at a spam
trap. Spam traps provide a window to glimpse into the un-
derlying network operations of online scammers who use
bulk email for solicitation. Because of relatively easy de-
ployment and data processing, many previous studies used
email collected at spam traps for measuring the effectiveness
of DNS-based blacklists [10], studying the network-level be-
havior of spammers [13], characterizing the scam hosting
infrastructure [2], and studying the dynamism of the IP ad-
dresses of spammers [23]. Others have used passive DNS
monitoring to study the dynamics of botnets [4, 12], which
are now believed to host fast-flux networks.
Content-based scam campaign clustering is a commonly
used technique for analyzing spammer behavior. Anderson
et al. used image fingerprints to group similar Web pages [2]
. Holz et al. used strings found from HTML documents for
grouping [6]. Pathak et al. propose that spammers could be
clustered into campaigns by looking for relationships across
SMTP connections [11]. In comparison, we used image
comparison in addition to string matches of the names of
embedded files of each URL. Although the similarity metric
employed in each work is slightly different, we believe that
clustering results would not bear too much difference.
3. DATA
Accordingly, our data collection and processing involves
three steps: (1) passive collection of spam data; (2) active
DNS monitoring of domains for scams contained in those
spam messages; (3) clustering of spam and DNS data by
campaign. This section describes our method for collect-
ing spam data and monitoring DNS record changes associ-
ated with the associated scam campaigns. We also describe
how we monitor the DNS dynamics of popular Web sites to
use as a baseline for comparison. We then explain how we
postprocess the data to group spam email messages (and the
associated DNS data) according to common campaigns. Fi-
nally, we discuss potential limitations of our data collection
and analysis methods.
3.1 Data Collection
Figure 1: Diagram of the data colletion; a fixed location
iterative resolver is set up. The resolver starts the queries
from a randomly selected root server, every 300 sec for
every domain. Here we feature the same fluxing domain
pathsouth.com as in Table 2. Our iterative resolver
logs all referrals and the DNS records that are returned
for every query, at each level of the DNS hierarchy.
To amass a collection of domains to monitor for fast-flux
behavior, we collected 3,360 distinct domain names that ap-
peared at spam email messages which were collected at a
large spam sink hole. To obtain this list of URLs, we used a
simple URL pattern matcher to extract URLs from the bod-
ies of the messages received at the spam trap. We collected
these domains over a period of three months, from October
1, 2007 to December 31, 2007.
Next, we implemented an iterative resolver (at a fixed lo-
cation) to resolve every domain name from this set once ev-
ery five minutes. Figure 1 shows the method by which our
resolver recorded DNS mappings at each level of DNS res-
olution, which allows us to monitor fast-flux networks for
DNS changes at three distinct locations in the hierarchy:
(1) the A record; (2) the NS record; and (3) the IP addresses
corresponding to the names in the NS record. To avoid pos-
sible caching effects, the resolver randomly selected a DNS
root server at which to start the DNS query. The iterative
resolver recorded the answers received at every level of the
DNS hierarchy; we recorded all the referrals and the answers
by the queried DNS servers for every domain.
Due to the sheer number of DNS lookups required to mon-
itor the domains arriving at the spam trap, the resolver pro-
ceeded through the list of domains sequentially: We began
by resolving the first 120 domains received at the spam trap
each day. Every day the resolver began resolving the next
120 domains on the list. After each domain had been re-
solved continously for three weeks, we removed the domain
from the list. The resolver operated from January 14, 2008
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to February 9, 2008.
To compare the dynamics of the domains received at the
spam trap as part of online scam campaigns to the DNS dy-
namics of “legitimate” domains, we used the same iterative
resolution process to study the dynamics of the 500 most
popular domains, according to Alexa [1].
3.2 Postprocessing: Scam Campaigns
After collecting spam and DNS data, we restricted our
analysis to the domains that had reachable Web sites and
for which we had observed at least one change in any DNS
record. We then clustered the spam messages into scam cam-
paigns. To perform this clustering, we retrieve content from
the URLs in the email messages and cluster emails whose
URLs retrieve common content:
• Snapshots and Web page sources. We used AutoIT [3]
to sequentially open each URL on a browser, wait until
the page is loaded, and take a snapshot of the current
page1. While doing so, HTTP Analyzer [9] captures all
the HTTP requests and responses for further analysis.
• Clustering by snapshots. We manually went through
snapshot images and cluster URLs if the site is selling
the same products under the same brand name using
a similar page layout. The clustering is manual and
subjective but fairly straightforward.
• Clustering supplemented with file comparison. The
image comparison fails in the case of partially down-
load pages. For example, pathsouth.com, one of the
Canadian Pharmacy [18] sites downloads 88 files, of
which 85 are jpeg and gif image files. Slow response,
which is often observed from fast flux service net-
works, allows only a few small none image files to be
received until the somewhat generous 30 second time-
out expires, generating an empty looking page when a
snapshot is taken. To make up this shortcoming, for the
URLs that are not classified, we check to see whether
the downloaded file names of each URL is a subset of
those of already identified campaign. We find that most
of partially downloaded pages are caused by the Cana-
dian Pharmacy campaign sites and that all of them re-
quest canadian pharmacy 2 style.css in common.
Table 3 shows the summary data of 21 campaigns. We
denote each campaign with a category-ID.2 The second col-
umn is the number of domain names that we found changing
during our one month measurement period (fluxing domain).
1We used a 30 second timeout value to move on to a next URL if
the current site is not reachable. The AutoIT script was executed
on a virtual machine running Windows XP to avoid possible drive-
by infection. We also disabled most security features that display
warnings or prompt for approvals as these interfere with automa-
tion.
2We looked at each Web page snapshot and assigned a category
based on offered products.
The following two columns show the number of total spam
emails containing the fluxing domains that we received at
our spam trap and the total number of sender IPs of those
spam emails. The last three columns summarize our mea-
surement data: the first two numbers are the total distinct
number of IPs returned as A records of domains (IPdomains)
and that of IPs returned as A records of name servers
(IPnameservers). the last number is the total distinct number
of IPs from the combined sets (IPdomains∪ IPnameservers) . For
comparison, Table 4 summarizes the Alexa dataset.
Domains IPs of A rec IPs of NS rec IPs of A+NS rec
Total 500 1048 852 1877
Table 4: Alexa dataset.
Top campaigns. The top campaign, by the number of host-
ing servers, is Pharmacy-A. We believe that it is one of
Canadian Pharmacy scam campaigns [18]. The campaign
swapped in at least of 9,448 distinct IP addresses as hosting
servers (or front end proxies of them) for 149 domains over
one month. The next two followers are Watch-A [17] and
Watch-B [16], both of which offer replica watches. We note
that for these top three campaigns, the average ratio of A
records associated with a domain name is over 50, allowing
the scamsters to freely move around among available host-
ing servers. However, the remaining campaigns are rather
modest and we even see the sharing of a few hosting servers
by multiple domains (e.g., Pharmacy-D and Links-B appear
to have only 5 hosting servers for 50 and 35 domains re-
spectively). Nonetheless, all 21 campaigns exhibited flux-
ing behavior in their DNS records to some extent during the
measurement period.
Registrars. The fast-flux domains in our dataset are mostly
.com (348, or 90.6%). The rest 8.4% are .net (32), .ph (3)
and .su (1). However, over 99% of these domains are unique
(e.g., a.com, b.com)3, requiring separate registrations with
the corresponding top-level domains. Table 5 shows regis-
trar information of the 384 fast-flux domains that we found
on May 7, 2008 via jwhois queries. 70% of the domains
are still marked as active and registered with eight regis-
trars in China, India, and US. Among these, the three reg-
istrars in China are responsible for 257 fast-flux domains
(66% of total or 95% of the active ones). Surprisingly, all but
paycenter.com.cn are ICANN-accredited registrars [7].
Figure 2 shows the month when these domains were regis-
tered. Because our data collection was done before February
2008, all the domains were registered before then. Interest-
ingly, however, over 40% were registered in January 2008
and immediately put in use for serving scams. Further, these
domains are still active even after four months and the 2%
of the domains had been active for over 7 months at the time
of our measurement. Unfortunately, our WHOIS lookup is
after the fact and thus we are unable to tell whether the 30%
3Only 4 out of 384 fast-flux domains have the same second-level
domain name.
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IPs of A rec IPs of NS rec IPs of both
A+NS rec
Pharmacy-A 18459 11670 149 149 9448 2340 9705
Watch-A 40681 30411 34 30 1516 225 1572
Watch-B 454 427 43 19 1204 219 1267
Pharmacy-B 371 223 86 52 15 13 22
Casino-A 317 226 6 6 12 12 16
Pharmacy-C 30 4 6 6 12 11 12
Casino-B 15 8 2 1 11 10 17
Links-A 15 8 2 2 10 14 22
Casino-C 4652 4150 9 5 10 14 18
E-Marketing-A 32 4 6 4 8 2 10
Pharmacy-D 37472 28340 52 50 5 5 6
Pharmacy-E 32 25 4 4 5 7 12
Links-B 5663 4573 38 35 5 5 6
Pharmacy-F 2 1 2 2 4 6 10
Pharmacy-G 208 205 2 2 3 8 8
Links-B 4 2 4 2 3 8 11
Service-A 9 1 3 1 2 4 4
Software-A 950 463 5 5 2 4 5
Watch-C 6226 4154 7 5 2 2 2
DomainNames-A 3 3 3 3 2 4 6
Service-B 26 2 2 1 1 3 4
All campaigns 115198 77030 465 384 9521 2421 9821
Table 3: Statistics for fast-flux networks hosting scam campaigns. Campaigns are sorted by the total number of IP
addresses returned from A records as the number indicates the size of the underlying infrastructure.
Registrar Country Domains
dns.com.cn China 180 ( 46.9%)
paycenter.com.cn China 65 ( 16.9%)
todaynic.com China 12 ( 3.1%)
signdomains.com India 7 ( 1.8%)
leadnetworks.com India 3 ( 0.8%)
coolhandle.com US 2 ( 0.5%)
webair.com US 1 ( 0.3%)
stargateinc.com US 1 ( 0.3%)
total active domains 271 ( 70.6%)
Table 5: Registrars of the 384 fast-flux domains as of
May 7, 2008.
inactive domains as of May 2008 are due to registration ex-
piration or some other reasons.
3.3 Limitations
Our data is derived from spam collected at a single spam
trap; different spam traps might receive different distribu-
tions of spam emails from different locations. The relatively
high volume of emails received at our spam trap (6,247,937
messages from the period of October 2007 through February
2008) suggests that the data we have collected may be rep-
resentative of spam and scam campaigns seen at other net-
works, although our trap may certainly induce some geog-
prahic bias (for example, spam traps located in other coun-
tries may receive different scams). We sampled our dataset
further by only actively monitoring a subset of the domains
contained in URLs received in spam messages at the spam
trap; in particular, we did not analyze domain names that
we could not explicitly group into a scam campaign. Many
of the domains that we could not group into a campaign also





























Figure 2: Record creation date for the 384 fast-flux do-
mains: Y-axis is the percentage of the fast-flux domains
that were registered on the particular month.
mains from the analysis because we could not confirm their
participation in an online scam.
Unlike a legitimate site, a scam campaign operates un-
der many different domain names (e.g., pathsouth.com, yes-
self.com), possibly to avoid URL blacklisting and perhaps
to spread the risk of being detected and terminated by vigi-
lant registrars. Our dataset may cover only a subset of these
names for each campaign and we are unaware of any clear
way to find out the true number of registered domain names
for each scam campaign. However, in most cases, each do-
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main within a campaign appears to show similar behavior.
In some cases, our DNS resolution process occurred
months after the spam message corresponding to the scam
was received at the spam trap. It is possible that the dynam-
ics of fast-flux networks may differ close to the time of the
receipt of the actual spam; however, our measurements sug-
gest that the dynamics of fast-flux networks for each scam
campaign (i.e., the rate of change of DNS records, the rate
of accumulation of new IP addresses) remain stable over the
course of a month, so it may be reasonable to expect similar
dynamic behavior closer to the original receipt of the mail.
We were surprised that most domains remained not only re-
solvable, but also reachable, even months after receipt of the
original spam email associated with the campaign. This be-
havior differs from the dynamics of scam hosting sites ob-
served in previous studies [2], which observed that many
scam sites remain active for only a week; the difference may
be due to the rise of fast-flux networks.
Our clustering technique assigns a URL to a single cam-
paign based on snapshots of the Web site’s content for a sin-
gle snapshot. It is possible that, over time, a single domain
could be used to host multiple campaigns; in these cases, our
analysis would attribute behavior to a single campaign (i.e.,
the one corresponding to our snapshot) when, in fact, the do-
main was hosting multiple campaigns over the course of our
analysis. We did not collect frequent enough snapshots to
detect such behavior.
4. DYNAMICS
This section presents our findings concerning the dynam-
ics of fast-flux service networks. We study three aspects of
dynamics: (1) the rate at which DNS records change at each
level of the hierarchy; (2) the rate at which fast flux net-
works accumulate new IP addresses (both overall, and by
campaign); and (3) the location in the DNS hierarchy where
dynamics are taking place. To understand the nature of these
features with respect to “legitimate” load balancing behav-
ior, we also analyze the same set of features for 500 popular
sites listed by Alexa [1] as a baseline. We find many aspects
of dynamics that are distinct to fast flux service networks.
4.1 Rate of Change
We studied the rates at which domains for online scams
changed DNS record mappings and the corresponding TTL
values for these records. We expected that fast-flux do-
mains would both have short TTL values and exhibit fre-
quent changes in name-to-IP address mappings.
Figure 3 compares the distributions of TTLs between the
fluxing domains and the domains in the Alexa data set. The
disritubiotn of A record TTLs shows that scam sites have
slightly shorter TTL values than popular Web sites; however,
both classes of Web sites have A records with a wide range
TTL values. Even more surprisingly, about 30% of popular
Web sites maintain NS records with TTL values of less than
a day, but almost all fast-flux domains we analyzed had TTL
values for NS records of longer than a day. In hindsight,
these results do make sense: many clients visiting scam sites
will visit a particular domain infrequently, and only a small
number of times, so the TTL value is less important than the
rate at which the mapping itself is changing (i.e., for new
clients that attempt to resolve the domain).
To detect changes that may be related to fast-flux behav-
ior, we record both the A records that are returned at Step
6 in Figure 1, and NS names and IP addresses of NS names
that are returned at Step 4. The reason why we record these
two separate pieces of information is because NS names and
IP addresses of NS names are not always returned with the A
records of the answer at Step 6; the lack of complete infor-
mation about the sequence of lookups in the DNS hierarchy
will make it difficult to observe all aspects of the dynamics.
To account for possible load-balancing mechanisms at a
higher level of the DNS hierarhcy, we group the responses
according to the authoritative server that provided them. We
then perform pairwise comparisons across each group of
records. In the case of A records responses and NS record re-
sponses, we consider response as a change if at least one new
record appears since last answer, or if the number of records
returned has otherwise changed since the last response. (We
do not consider reordering the records as a change.) In the
case ofIP addresses of NS records, we consider the response
to be a change if either NS names appear with different IPs
or a new NS name shows up since last reply.
Fast-flux domains change on shorter time intervals
than their TTL values. Figure 4 shows a distribution of
the average time between changes for each domain across
all 21 scam campaigns; each point on the line represents
the average time between changes for a particular domain
that we monitored. The distribution shows that fast-flux do-
mains change hosting servers (A records) and name servers
(IP addresses of NS records) more frequently than popu-
lar Web servers do. In particular, the rate of change of IP
of NS records is much more frequent than TTL values of
these records, causing possible service disruption for return-
ing clients. In some cases, for example the IP addresses of
NS records, the changes are significantly more frequent than
the TTL values would suggest. The incongruence of DNS
TTL values with the rates at which these records are actually
changing could also prove to be a useful feature for detecting
fast-flux behavior.
Domains in the same campaign tend to show similar
rates of change. We also analyzed the rate of change of
DNS records after clustering the fast-flux domains according
to campaign. Figure 5 shows these results for the top 4 cam-
paigns (ranked by the number of distinct IPs returned in A
records for domains hosting the campaigns). The results are
striking: different scam campaigns rotate DNS record map-
pings at distinct rates, and the rates at which DNS records
for a particular campaign are remapped are similar across all
domains for a particular scam. This finding suggests that it























































































(c) IP of NS records










































































(c) IP of NS records
Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of the average time between changes of A, NS, and IP of NS records.
DNS hierarchy as a type of signature for a scam campaign.
4.2 Rate of Accumulation
Ideally, we wish to know the size of a fast flux service net-
work at a given moment and to measure the rate at which the
network grows over time. However, in practice, our mea-
surement is limited by the rate at which a flux domain up-
dates its DNS records and what we present in this section is
the rate at which a previously unseen host becomes an active
hosting server (A records of a domain) or a name server (IP
addresses of names returned by NS records).
Using a method similar to the one used by Holz et al. [6],
we determine the rate of “flux” by repeatedly resolving each
domain and assigning an increasing sequential ID to each
previously unseen IP address. Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show
the total number of distinct IPs for each fast-flux domain (the
y-value of the end of each line) over the first week of our data
collection period (first 2,000 iterations, 300 seconds apart
from each other) and how fast each domain accumulated
new hosts (slope). A steeper slope incidates more rapid ac-
cumulation of new IP addresses for that domain. Figure 6(a)
shows this statistic for A records and Figure 6(b) shows the
same statistic for IP addresses of NS records of the domains
that belong to campaign Pharmacy-A (top campaign). In-
terestingly, the rate of accumulation is much slower (almost
an order of magnitude) for hosts used as name servers, as
shown in Figure 6(b).
Many domains in the same campaign have similar
accumulation rates. We see many domains with similar
slopes throughout the month. These domains tend to belong
to a same campaign. However, not all the fluxing domains
belonging to the same campaign have similar slops (See Fig-
ure 6(c)). One reasonable explanation is that a scam cam-
paign runs on multiple fast flux networks, each of which has
a different rate of recruiting and swapping in a new host. In
any case, it is alarming to see that many fluxing domains can
easily throw in thousands of hosting servers and hundreds of
name servers over a month.
Some domains only begin accumulating IP addresses
after some period of dormancy. Some domains appear to
exhaust available hosts for a while (days to weeks) before ac-
cumulating new IP addresses. We examined two campaigns
that exhibited rapid accumulation of IP addresses after some
dormancy. In both cases, only one domain per campaign be-
gins accumulating IP addresses. These two domains shared
exactly the same set of NS names. These 8 NS names are















































































(c) IP of NS records
Figure 5: Cumulative distributions of the average time between changes of A, NS, and IP of NS records for Pharmacy-A,
Watch-A, Watch-B, and Pharmacy-B.









































(b) IP of NS records























Pharmacy−A Start of DNS queries
Pharmacy−B, Watch−B Start of DNS queries





(c) A records - Top 4


















Pharmacy−A Start of DNS queries
Pharmacy−B, Watch−B Start of DNS queries





(d) IP of NS records - Top 4
Figure 6: Cumulative number of distinct IPs for the
A records and IP addresses of NS records, for the
first week (first 2,000 iterations of data collection) for
the Pharmacy-A domains, and for the top 4 campaigns
across the four weeks of data collection.
other scams (e.g., the canadian pharmacy as well) where a
few domains accumulate IP addresses faster than others. In
addition to accumulation, we also saw attrition: 10% of flux-
ing domains became unreachable in the while we were mon-
itoring them. These domains may have been blacklisted and
so removed by registrars or by scamsters themselves.
Rates of accumulation differ across campaigns. Fig-
ures 6(c) and 6(d) show the rate of accumulation of IP ad-
dresses for the top four campaigns for the IP addresses of A
records and NS records, respectively. The rate of accumu-
lation for each campaign is higher than that of each fluxing





















Pharmacy-A 149 77 72
Watch-A 30 4 1 24 1
Watch-B 19 18 1
Pharmacy-B 52 5 13 19 15
Casino-A 6 1 5
Pharmacy-C 6 6
Casino-B 1 1
Links-A 2 1 1
Casino-C 5 5
E-Marketing-A 4 4
Pharmacy-D 50 2 3 45
Pharmacy-E 4 4
Links-B 35 1 34
Pharmacy-F 2 2




Watch-C 5 4 1
DomainNames-A 3 3
Service-B 1 1
Total 384 18 52 3 219 1 91
Alexa 500 (do-
mains)
37 5 15 4 1 1
Table 6: Location of change for all campaigns, sorted by
the total number of distinct IPs of A records.
a campaign, the total number of distinct IP addresses for a
campaign is fewer than the sum of that of an individual do-
main. Section 5.2 will discuss how infrastructure is shared
across domains and across campaigns in more detail.
4.3 Location of Change in DNS hierarchy
While it is possible to change any record of your own
domain in DNS hierarchy (A, NS, and IP addresses of NS
records), it is substantially more difficult to change NS

























































(b) IP of NS records
Figure 8: Distribution of unique /24s that appeared as
























































(b) IP of NS records
Figure 9: Distribution of unique /24s that appeared for
all records in a reply.
updating a parent domain’s (often a top level domain such
as .com) zone file. However, we see many fast-flux domains
that freely change NS records or IP of NS records separately
or in combination of other records.
Campaigns change DNS record mappings at different
levels of the DNS hierarchy. Table 6 shows the type of
change for each campaign. In contrast to previous stud-
ies [8, 21], we observe many different types of changes in
addition to single flux (A records) and double flux (A + IP
of NS). Another notable point is that each campaign tends
to use mixes of techniques (e.g., For Pharmacy-A, 52% of
domains are double flux and 48% change all three types of
records). We believe that this is another indication that a
campaign operates on multiple fast flux service networks.
5. ROLES
This section describes the roles (e.g., content hosting,
name service, spamming) played by hosts in fast flux ser-
vice networks and how these roles evolve over time. We first
examine the geographic and topological locations of fast-
flux nodes; we also compare these locations to the spam-
ming hosts that mount the messages in the scam campagins.
We then explore how the roles of fast-flux nodes evolve over
time, and how the fast-flux infrastructure is shared across
different scam campaigns.
5.1 Location
In this section, we examine the network and geographic
location of fast flux hosts and compare them to both legiti-
mate Web sites and the spammers who advertise the scams.
5.1.1 Network Location
This section describes how fast-flux IP addressess are
spread across IP address space. To examime whether fast-
flux service networks use different portions of the IP space
than the top 500 domains, we plotted the distribution of the
IPs across the whole IP range. Figure 7 shows that fast-flux
networks use a different portion of the IP space than sites that
host popular legitimate content: The IPs that host legitimate
sites are considerably more distributed: and more than 30%
of these sites are hosted in the 30/8-60/8 IP address range,
which hosted almost none of the scam sites observed in our
study.
Fast-flux hosts are concentrated in small regions of
IP address space; some spammers are concentrated in
slightly different regions. Interestingly, the IP address
space that hosts fast-flux domains is even more concentrated
than that which sends spam advertising the scam campaigns.
Although the distributions are ismilarly concentrated in the
80/8 - 90/8 range, there is a much higher concentration of
spammers in the 200/8 - 210/8 range (ranges allocated to
Latin America and Asia, respectively). These differing dis-
tributions suggest that hosts in different regions of the IP
address space do in fact play different “roles” in spam cam-
paigns.
DNS lookups for fast-flux domains often return much
more widely distributed IP addresses than lookups for
legitimate Web sites. Our intuition was that fast-flux net-
works that hosted scame sites would be more distributed
across the network than legitimate Web hosting sites, par-
ticularly from the perspective of DNS queries from a sin-
gle client (even in the case of a distributed content distri-
bution network, DNS queries would tend to map a single
client to nearby Web cache). Figures 8 and 9 show the
distribution of distinct /24s that appear at the answer sec-
tion of the DNS replies) for the first record in the reply and
for all records in the reply, respectively. It turns out that a
few legitimate domains that are hosted by content distribu-
tion networks appear to have the largest number of distinct
/24s contained in a single DNS reply. In particular, www.
runescape.com, www.statcounter.com, www.yahoo.co.
jp, www.monografias.com returns IP addresses in 12, 8, 7,
and 6 distinct /24s respectively. We also observed several
legitimate domains which showed a large number of distinct
/24s for their IPs of NS records (which actually reflects good
network design because it introduces redundancy). Exam-
ples include www.altavista.com, www.geocities.com,
www.runescape.com, www.php.net which had 11, 9, 8, and
7 distinct /24s in IPs of NS records.
Fast flux domains tend to return IP addresses that are
distributed across a larger number of distinct /24s than le-
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Fluxing domains − IPs of A rec
Alexa − IPs of A rec
(a) A records

















Fluxing domains − IPs of NS rec
Alexa − IPs of NS rec
(b) IP of NS records
Figure 7: Distribution of the IPs of A rec, of autoritative servers and the IPs that sent the originating spam.
Top ASes by A Rec Top ASes by IP of NS Rec Top ASes by Spamming IPs
8402 - CORBINA-AS (1232) 12714 TI-AS NetByNet Holding (365) 9121 TTNET (6566)
12714 - TI-AS NetByNet Holding (1127) 3904 - HUTCHISON-AS-AP (260) 6147 Telefonica del Peru (3173)
9304 - HUTCHISON-AS-AP (951) 8402 - CORBINA-AS (224) 22927 Telefonica de Argentina (2726)
7132 - AT& T (511) 7132 - AT& T (121) 5617 TPNET Polish Telecom (2356)
6855 - SK SLOVAK TELECOM (345) 9908 - HKCABLE2-HK-AP (91) 19262 VZGNI-TRANSIT Verizon (2107)
13184 - HANSENET (332) 12695 - DINET-AS (81) 4837 CHINA169-BACKBONE (1697)
12695 - DINET-AS (307) 20597 - ELTEL-AS (72) 7738 Telecomunicacoes da Bahia (1524)
3209 - Arcor IP-Network (270) 13184 - HANSENET(66) 8359 COMSTAR (1436)
8615 - CNT-AS (252) 4766 - KIXS-AS-KR Korea Tel. (60) 4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE (1344)
3320 - DTAG (203) 30784 - ISKRATELECOM-AS(59) 9829 BSNL-NIB (1340)
Table 7: Top 10 ASes by number of IPs.
gitimate domains. Indeed, roughly 40% of all A records
returned for fast-flux domains were distributed across at
least 300 distinct /24s, and many were distributed across
thousands of /24s. In contrast, domains for popular Web
sites were never distributed across more than 12 distinct
/24s (when queried from a single location). Thus, overly
widespread distribution of query replies may serve as a
strong indicator that a domain is indeed hosted by a fast-flux
network.
The predominant networks that host fast-flux infras-
tructure differ from those that host spammers for the
corresponding scam campaigns. Table 7 shows the top
ten ASes by the number of IP addresses for A records (i.e.,
hosting sites), NS records (i.e., nameservers), and spammers
(as observed in the spam trap). Interestingly, although there
is some overlap between the ASes that host the scam sites
and those that host authoritative nameservers, there is almost
no overlap between the ASes that host the sites and name-
servers for the scams do not overlap much with the ASes
hosting the spamming IP addresses. Indeed, Figure 7 also
shows that spammers for the campaigns we observed are
more heavily concentrated in Latin America, Turkey, and the
United States, whereas fast-flux hosts are more concentrated
in Asia. The fact that significant differences exist between
networks that host fast-flux infrastructure and those that host
spammers suggest that scammers may have divided the in-
frastructure into different roles (in Section 6, we see that
many fast-flux hosts are not listed on spam blacklists, which
is consistent with this observation).
5.1.2 Geographic location
Hosting servers and name servers are widely distributed.
Table 8 lists country names in which fast flux nodes are
hosted, according to the country of the AS in which they
are hosted. In total, we observed IP addresses for A records
in 283 ASes across 50 countries, IP addresses for NS records
in 191 ASes across 40 countries, and IP addresses for spam-
mers for the corresponding scam campaigns across 2,976
IP addresses across 157 countries. Although many fast flux
nodes appear to be in Russia, Germany, and the US, the long
list of ASes and countries shows that fast flux service net-
works are truly distributed; this kind of geographical distri-
bution may be necessary to accommodate the diurnal pattern
of compromised hosts’ uptime [5]. Interestingly, the coun-
tries that are referred to by the most A records are not the
same set of countries that host authoritative nameservers for
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Top Countries by A
Rec
Top Countries by
IP of NS Rec
Top Countries by
Spamvertising IPs
Russia (4025) Russia (982) US (6972)
Germany (1207) Hong Kong (425) Turkey (6580)
Hong Kong (1207) Germany (216) Russia (5914)
US (606) US (168) Brazil (4606)
Slovakia (391) Korea (154) Argentina (4268)
Korea (350) China (77) China (4041)
Israel (337) Japan (64) Poland (3424)
Japan (248) Taiwan (48) India (3302)
Ukraine (247) Ukraine (40) Peru (3214)
Romania (131) Slovakia (39) Germany (3122)
Table 8: Top 10 countries by number of IPs.
Sharing of A records
Pharmacy-A Watch-A Watch-B Pharmacy-B
Total per campaign 9448 1516 1204 15
Pharmacy-A - 1510 1203 1
Watch-A 1510 - 1203 1
Watch-B 1203 1203 - 1
Pharmacy-B 1 1 1 -
Sharing of NS records
Pharmacy-A Watch-A Watch-B Pharmacy-B
Total per campaign 52 14 10 10
Pharmacy-A - 8 8 0
Watch-A 8 - 8 0
Watch-B 8 8 - 0
Pharmacy-B 0 0 0 -
Sharing of IPs of NS records
Pharmacy-A Watch-A Watch-B Pharmacy-B
Total per campaign 2340 225 219 13
Pharmacy-A - 220 215 9
Watch-A 220 - 215 9
Watch-B 215 215 - 6
Pharmacy-B 9 9 6 -
Table 9: Sharing among the top 4 campaigns.
those domains (as indicated by IP addresses of NS records).
In particular, Slovakia, Israel, and Romania appear to host
relatively more nameservers than sites, and China appears
to host relatively more nameservers. This difference in dis-
tribution deserves further study; one possible explanation is
that nameserver infrastructure for fast-flux networks must be
more robust than the sites that host scams (which might be
relatively transient). countries
5.2 Sharing Across Campaigns
In this section, we describe our findings regarding the
sharing of the same fast-flux infrastructure across multiple
scam campaigns.
Many fast-flux machines have dual roles, and differ-
ent campaigns share hosting infrastructure. Referring
back to Table 3, the last three columns indicate that many
hosting servers double as name servers (and vice versa).
16 out of 21 campaigns (76%) show such sharing. On the
contrary, we see a clear role separation of the hosts asso-
ciated with the domains of the popular Web sites listed by
Alexa. We also find significant overlaps among the hosts
involved for the top four campaigns. Table 9 shows that
Watch-A and Watch-B are likely to share the underlying
infrastructure—99% of hosting servers, 80% of NS records,
and 98% of name servers of Watch-B are common with those
used for Watch-A. Moreover, both campaigns share many of
the servers and NS records with Pharmacy-A. This overlap
strongly suggests that the all three campaigns involve same
fast-flux service networks. Interestingly, our observation is
consistent with Spam Trackers [14], which attributes all the
three scam campaigns to Yambo Financials [15].
6. RELATIONSHIP TO BLACKLISTS
In this section, we evaluate whether the IPs that show up
as part of the fast-flux network hosting infrastructure ap-
pear on various blacklists: (1) the Spamhaus spam black-
list (SBL/PBL) [19]; (2) the Spamhaus exploit blacklist
(XBL) [20]; and (3) the URI blacklist (URIBL) [22]. We
find, generally, that the time to blacklisting varies signifi-
cantly by blacklist, and that many fast-flux IP addresses are
not listed in the SBL; those that are tend to be listed both
before and after we observed fast-flux activity.
Method. To determine whether the IP addresses in our
dataset are blacklisted at the time that we witness them
as part of fast-flux infrastructure, or whether they become
blacklisted at some later point, we query each blacklists
database for historical information about listing. Georgia
Tech actively runs mirrors for SpamHaus SBL/PBL/XBL
and for URIBL, which gives us access to precise informa-
tion about when each IP address or domain is listed in the
database. We query the following databases:
• XBL, a real-time database of IP addresses of infected
machines including open proxies worms/viruses with
built-in spam engines, and other types exploits.
• SBL, a realtime database of IP addresses of verified
spam sources and spam operations.
• PBL, a database of end-user IP address ranges that
should not be delivering unauthenticated SMTP email
to any Internet mail server except those provided for
specifically by an ISP for that customer’s use.
• URIBL, a realtime blacklist that lists domains that ap-
pear in spam and are likely phishing or scam sites.
Many fast-flux IP addresses and domains do not ap-
pear in blacklists at the time when their activity is first
observed. We queried the blacklist data at the end of April
2008 for historical information (back to February 2007) for
each IP address and domain from our dataset. Table 10
shows the number of IPs that were already blacklisted before
we observed them at our dataset, IPs that were blacklisted
after we observed them in our dataset, IPs that were black-
listed as active before and after we observed, and finally IPs
that were never blacklisted (by the time we querried the BLs
database). Table 10 shows that a significant fraction of IP
addresses hosting scam infrastructure (more than 17%) were
never listed in the SBL; considerably higher fractions were
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Figure 10: CDF of time elapsed between the appearance of an IP address in our dataset, either as IP of A record or
IP of NS record of a fluxing domain and the timestamp of appearance at Spamhaus BL. Also the same for the fluxing
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Figure 11: CDF of time elapsed between the appearance of an IP address, either as IP of A record or IP of NS record
of a fluxing domain at a blacklist, and the timestamp of appearance in our dataset (The “opposite” from Figure 10).)
SBL/PBL XBL
Never B A B+A Never B A B+A Total
A 1692 29 283 7517 265 244 2648 6364 9521
NS 547 7 80 1787 183 98 481 1659 2421
URIBL
Never B A B+A Total
Domains 113 0 138 133 384
Table 10: IPs of A records, IPs of NS records and do-
mains which were blacklisted before (B), after (A) or be-
fore and after (B+A) when they appeared at our collec-
tion of DNS records.
dresses and domains listed in the XBL and URIBL respec-
tively were only listed after we observed activity from those
IP addresses and domains. The lack of these IP addresses in
the SBL could suggest one of two things: (1) the SpamHaus
SBL is incomplete; or (2) the SBL may simply not list this
fraction of IP addresses because it was never used to spam
(i.e., it only hosted scam infrastructure).
Time to listing after activity is observed can vary from
hours to weeks, depending on the blacklist. IP addresses
tend to take longer to show up in the Spamhaus SBL. To
determine how long it takes for IP addresses to appear in var-
ious blacklists after we observed their activity, we measured
the time between when we observed the IP addresses partic-
ipating in fast-flux activity and the time when they were first
blacklisted. Figure 10 shows the distribution of these delays.
We plot the CDFs of the elapsed times between appearance
and listing for XBL, SBL/PBL, and URIBL.
Most IP addresses are listed relatively quickly (if they are
not already listed when we observe either activity), but for
some IP addresses and domains, the time that elapses be-
tween the time we first observe activity and the time an IP
address or domain is listed is on the order of weeks. These
delays in listing IP addresses in the SBL suggests that there
are parts of fast-flux networks that are used first as flux
agents and later as spam relays. In these cases, monitor-
ing hosts for fast-flux activity may be useful for predicting
future spamming activity. Figure 11 shows the same distri-
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Not appeared Before After Bef.+After Total
IPs of A rec 9417 11 92 1 9521
IPs of NS rec 2420 5 16 0 2421
Table 11: IPs of A records, IPs of NS records and do-
mains which appeared at our spamtrap as spam relays
before (B), after (A) or before and after (B+A) their time
of appearance at our collection of DNS records.
bution, but for IP addresses that were listed before we ob-
served activity from them in our dataset. Interestingly, most
IP addresses that were listed before we observed their activ-
ity were listed in the XBL weeks to months before we ob-
served them (IP addresses for A records were listed sooner).
We observe a small amount of overlap between IP ad-
dress that host fast-flux infrastructure and those that
send spam to our spam trap. To further understand the
relationship between spamming infrastructure and the scam
hosting infrastructure, we examined the overlap between IP
addresses that spam and those that host infrastructure: For
each IP address that we observed (IPs of A records and IPs
of NS records), we checked to see whether the IP had sent
any spam emails to the same spam trap from which we ex-
tracted the fluxing domains over the period of October 2007
through February 2008 (i.e., from nearly three months be-
fore the start of our collection of fast flux data until 1 month
after our data collection). Table 11 shows that a very small
fraction of IP addresses (about 1%) sent spam to our spam
trap either before or after the time when we observed them
as part of the scam hosting infrastructure. The small overlap
may simply reflect the fact that our trap only sees a fraction
of all spam (and spammers). These spamming IPs adver-
tise the same fast-flux domains that they are hosting, which
suggests that the spamming infrastructure and the hosting
infrastructure may be shared.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an empirical study of the dynam-
ics and roles of fast-flux networks in mounting scam cam-
paigns. We actively monitored the DNS records for URLs
for scam campaigns received at a large spam sinkhole over
a one-month period to study the rates of change in fast-flux
networks, the locations in the DNS hierarchy that change,
and the extent to which the fast-flux network infrastructure
is shared across different campaigns. We also contrast the
dynamics observed in these networks to that used for load
balancing for popular Web sites. Our findings suggest that
monitoring the infrastructure for unusual changes in DNS
mappings may be helpful for detecting scams hosted on fast-
flux networks. In future work, we plan to use these features
design a detection scheme that can automatically identify
scam campaigns based on invariant properties of the infras-
tructure. We expect that doing so may allow us to detect
online scams automatically, and considerably faster than to-
day’s manual blacklisting mechanisms.
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